The determinants of academic career advancement: Evidence from Italy by Abramo, Giovanni et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 20, 2017
The determinants of academic career advancement: Evidence from Italy
Abramo, Giovanni ; D’Angelo, Ciriaco Andrea ; Rosati, Francesco
Published in:
Science and Public Policy
Link to article, DOI:
10.1093/scipol/scu086
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Abramo, G., D’Angelo, C. A., & Rosati, F. (2015). The determinants of academic career advancement: Evidence
from Italy. Science and Public Policy, 42(6), 761-774. DOI: 10.1093/scipol/scu086
This is the accepted version of the research article: Abramo, G., D’Angelo, C. A., & Rosati, F. (2015). The determinants of academic career 
advancement: Evidence from Italy. Science and Public Policy. DOI: 10.1093/scipol/scu086. Available in final form at: 
http://spp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/02/26/scipol.scu086.short  
 
The determinants of academic career advancement: evidence from Italy 
 
 
Giovanni Abramoa,*, Ciriaco Andrea D’Angelob,a, Francesco Rosatic 
 
a Laboratory for Studies of Research and Technology Transfer 
Institute for System Analysis and Computer Science (IASI-CNR) 
National Research Council of Italy 
ADDRESS: Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche 
Istituto di Analisi dei Sistemi e Informatica 
Via dei Taurini 19, 00185 Roma – ITALY 
tel. and fax +39 06 72597362, giovanni.abramo@uniroma2.it 
 
b Department of Engineering and Management 
University of Rome “Tor Vergata” 
ADDRESS: Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Impresa 
Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”, 
Via del Politecnico 1, 00133 Roma – ITALY 
tel. and fax +39 06 72597362, dangelo@dii.uniroma2.it 
 
c Department of Management Engineering 
Technical University of Denmark 
ADDRESS: Technical University of Denmark 
Produktionstorvet Building 426 
2800 Kgs. Lyngby - Denmark 
tel +45 45256021, frro@dtu.dk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of professors’ career advancement in Italian 
universities. From the analyses, it emerges that the fundamental determinant of an 
academic candidate’s success is not scientific merit, but rather the number of years that 
the candidate has belonged to the same university as the president of the selection 
committee. Where applicants have participated in research work with the president, 
their probability of success also increases significantly. The factors of the years of 
service and occurrence of joint research with other members of the commission also 
have an effect, however, that carries less weight. Nepotism, although it exists, seems 
less important. The scientific quality of the members of the commission has a negligible 
effect on the expected outcome of the competition, and even less so the geographical 
location of the university holding the competition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Given the role of human capital in the current knowledge-based economy, 
organizations must attempt to optimize their human resources recruitment and career 
advancement processes. Such strategies are even more important in the case of higher 
education systems because of the role universities play in support of national industrial 
competitiveness, socio-economic development and social mobility. 
In competitive higher education systems, universities are in constant competition in 
seeking out the best researchers and teaching professors from both at home and abroad. 
However in the higher education systems of several European nations such competitive 
mechanisms are often weak. In many cases, recruitment and advancement take place by 
means of relatively rigid procedures, frequently regulated by a central bureaucracy. For 
example, in Italy appointments to academic positions are not handled through local ad 
hoc search committees or advertisements in international scientific journals; instead all 
vacancies are submitted to the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research 
(MIUR) which every so often announces national competitions for all disciplines. Such 
centrally regulated competitions have come under heavy fire and the Italian word 
“concorso” has soon gained international currency as a term denoting a rigged 
competition, involving favoritism, nepotism and other unfair selection practices 
(Gerosa, 2001). A number of instances of court cases (Perotti, 2008; Zagaria, 2007) and 
injustice have been reported in letters published in such prestigious journals as Lancet, 
Science and Nature (Garattini, 2001; Aiuti et al., 1994; Biggin, 1994; Amadori et al., 
1992; Gaetani and Ferraris 1991; Fabbri, 1986). 
Problems of fairness in appointments to academic positions are certainly not limited 
to Italy: the international literature has dedicated considerable attention to the study of 
academic recruitment and promotion, largely regarding questions of gender and 
minority discrimination (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2012; van den Brink et al., 2010; Cora-
Bramble, 2006; Price et al., 2005; Trotman et al., 2002; Stanley et al., 2007). One of the 
conclusions is that discriminatory phenomena seem to develop above all when 
evaluations are based on non-transparent criteria (Rees, 2004; Ziegler, 2001; Husu, 
2000; Ledwith and Manfredi, 2000; Allen, 1988). In effect, academic recruitment is 
often reported as an informal process in which a few powerful professors select new 
ones through cooptation mechanisms (van den Brink et al., 2010; Husu, 2000; 
Fogelberg et al., 1999; Evans, 1995). Such mechanisms often conceal the phenomenon 
of favoritism, which has been intensively examined in only a few nations, such as 
Turkey (Aydogan, 2012), Australia (Martin, 2009), Spain (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 
2012) and Italy (Perotti, 2008; Zagaria, 2007). In Italy, there has recently been strong 
interest in the study of nepotism, which is a particular form of favoritism. While 
Allesina (2011) and Durante et al. (2011 and 2009) report the unequivocal detection of 
the phenomenon, Abramo et al. (2014a) are more cautious: while they do not deny the 
presence of nepotism, they show that the probability of a “child” of a full professor in 
the same university not meriting his or her position is equal to that of any “non-child”. 
This result is in line with the findings of many sociological studies (Dunn and Holtz-
Eakin, 2000; Lentz and Laband, 1989; Simon et al., 1966), which suggest that 
“children” employed in universities may have in fact received a substantial amount of 
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qualifying career-related knowledge from their parents. Whatever the case for nepotism, 
it does not deal with the concerns for other forms of favoritism that clearly distort 
faculty recruitment and career advancement, particularly in countries characterized by 
scarce intensity of competition among universities. Thus Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012), 
examining the phenomenon in the Spanish university system, concentrated on the role 
of connections between the candidates and the evaluators composing the examining 
boards that decide on academic promotions. They show that the future performance of 
candidates who were promoted and had a weak connection with the evaluators was 
better than that of their “non-connected” colleagues. Conversely, successful candidates 
with a strong link to the evaluators register worse performance both before and after 
their promotion. 
Given the troubling analyses and case evidence, it appears that the efficiency of 
various recruitment and advancement processes in universities should be subject to ex-
post evaluation. After a given lapse of time it is indeed possible to quantify the level of 
efficiency of the personnel selections through comparative evaluation of the academics’ 
personal achievements in the scientific research sphere. The efficiency of the 
recruitment and promotion processes can be evaluated by comparing the selected to the 
rejected candidates in terms of their research performance over a period subsequent to 
the actual competition. 
In a preceding study (Abramo et al., 2014b), the authors investigated the efficiency 
of the selection process for career advancement in the Italian academic system, referring 
to the case of all associate professor competitions announced in 2008 (a total of 1,232). 
This represented a massive intake for a single year, largely for upgrades from assistant 
to associate professor, with the new staff amounting to 13% of the pre-existing associate 
professor faculty. The analysis showed that, in the three years subsequent to the 
competitions, the new associate professors were on average more scientifically 
productive than their incumbent colleagues. However several critical issues appeared, 
particularly concerning unsuccessful candidates who outperformed the competition 
winners in terms of research productivity, as well as a number of competition winners 
who resulted as totally unproductive. Specifically, it emerged that 29% of the winners 
had productivity below the median of the performance distribution for their peers in the 
same field of research, and that 5.5% of the winners had not produced any significant 
advancement in scientific knowledge. An analysis of the individual competitions 
showed that almost half of them selected candidates who would go on to achieve below-
median productivity in their field of research over the subsequent triennium. 
In the present study, given the above critical concerns, the authors investigate the 
determinants that could have affected the selection procedures other than the scientific 
merit of the candidates, and attempt to interpret the “non-merit” factors that could 
potentially have been involved. We investigate the potential phenomenon of favoritism, 
particularly in terms of the factors of nepotism and social proximity between the 
candidates and their evaluators. Finally we will examine the correlation between the 
expected outcomes of competitions and the scientific productivity of the evaluators, as 
well as the expected outcomes and the territorial localization of the universities that 
announced the competitions. 
We acknowledge that research performance is not the only dimension of quality of a 
candidate. Evaluations of applicants should also consider dimensions representing the 
other two institutional missions of universities, meaning teaching and technology 
transfer. Furthermore, the assessment of research performance by quantity and quality 
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of output alone neglects other attributes of the scientists’ activities, for example the 
ability to manage research teams, to attract funds, their activities in consulting, editorial 
work, and so on. We would expect some level of correlation between research 
productivity and these other variables, however caution is recommended in the 
interpretation of our results, in which we consider only dimensions involving research 
output. 
The next section of the paper summarizes the structure and function of the Italian 
higher education system, with particular regard to the measures adopted in 2008 for 
recruitment of associate professors. Sections 3 and 4 present the details of the 
methodology and dataset used for the analysis, followed by the results. The work 
concludes with the authors’ discussion and recommendations. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 The Italian higher education system 
 
The MIUR recognizes a total of 96 universities as having the authority to issue 
legally-recognized degrees. Twenty-nine of these are private, small-sized, special-focus 
universities, of which 13 offer only e-learning. Sixty-seven are public and generally 
multi-disciplinary universities, scattered throughout the nation. Six of them are Scuole 
Superiori (Schools for Advanced Studies), specifically devoted to highly talented 
students, with very small faculties and tightly limited enrolment per degree program. In 
the overall system, 94.9% of faculty are employed in public universities (0.5% in 
Scuole Superiori). Public universities are largely financed by government through non-
competitive allocation. Until 2009 the core government funding (56% of universities’ 
total income) was input oriented, i.e. independent of merit, and distributed to 
universities in a manner intended to equally satisfy the needs of each and all, in function 
of their size and disciplines of research. It was only following the first national research 
evaluation exercise (VTR), conducted between 2004 and 2006, that a minimal share, 
equivalent to 3.9% of total income, was assigned by the MIUR in function of the 
assessment of research and teaching. 
Despite interventions intended to grant increased autonomy and responsibilities to 
the universities (Law 168 of 19891), the Italian higher education system is a long-
standing, classic example of a public and highly centralized governance structure, with 
low levels of autonomy at the university level and a very strong role played by the 
central state. 
In keeping with the Humboldtian model, there are no “teaching-only” universities in 
Italy, as all professors are required to carry out both research and teaching. National 
legislation includes a provision that each faculty member must provide a minimum of 
350 hours per year. At the close of 2012, there were 57,400 faculty members in Italy 
(full, associate and assistant professors) and a roughly equal number of technical-
administrative staff. All new personnel enter the university system through public 
1 This law was intended to grant increased autonomy and responsibility to the universities to establish 
their own organizational frameworks, including charters and regulations. Subsequently, Law 537 (Article 
5) of 1993 and Decree 168 of 1996 provided further changes intended to increase university involvement 
in overall decision-making on use of resources, and to encourage individual institutions to operate on the 
market and reach their own economic and financial equilibrium. 
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competitions, and career advancement can only proceed by further public competitions, 
as indicated in the next section. 
Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according to role 
(administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example assistant, 
associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends on merit. 
Moreover, as in all Italian public administration, dismissal of unproductive employees is 
unheard of. 
The entire legislative-administrative context creates an environment and culture that 
are completely non-competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic 
behaviors that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education 
system. The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely 
undifferentiated for quality and prestige, with the exception of the tiny Scuole Superiori 
and a very small number of private, special-focus universities. The system is thus 
unable to attract significant talented foreign faculty, or even students. The numbers are 
negligible: only 1.8% of research staff are foreign nationals. This is a system where 
every university has some share of top scientists, flanked by another share of absolute 
non-producers. Over the 2004-2008 period, 6,640 (16.8%) of the 39,512 hard-sciences 
professors did not publish any scientific articles in the journals indexed by the Web of 
Science (WoS). Another 3,070 professors (7.8%) did achieve publication, but their work 
was never cited (Abramo et al., 2013a). This means that 9,710 individuals (24.6%) had 
no impact on scientific progress measurable by bibliometric databases2. An almost 
equal 23% of professors alone produced 77% of the overall Italian scientific 
advancement. This 23% of “top” faculty is not concentrated in a limited number of 
universities, but is instead dispersed more or less uniformly among all Italian 
universities, along with the unproductive academics, so that no single institution reaches 
the critical mass of excellence necessary to develop as an elite university and compete at 
the international level (Abramo et al., 2012a). 
 
 
2.2 Recruitment and career advancement 
 
In Italy, the recruitment and career advancement of professors are regulated by 
specific law, overseen by the authority of the MIUR. There have been major reforms of 
the norms over recent years, with the last one being Law 240 of 2010, which introduced 
a double level of evaluation for selection of associate and full professors. The first level 
is national, managed directly by the MIUR, and is intended to indicate all those 
candidates with sufficient qualifications in terms of the scientific activity they have 
conducted; the second is managed by the individual universities, to select those that are 
best suited to the specific needs of the university from among those first judged 
qualified at the national level. Prior to Law 240, the processes of recruitment and career 
advancement were in the hands of the individual universities, following procedures 
dictated at the central level. The new two-step national selection procedures are still in a 
start-up phase. 
The last major competition under the old system was held in 2008. In the Italian 
university system all professors are classified in one and only field (named scientific 
disciplinary sector - SDS, 370 in all), grouped into disciplines (named university 
2 Researchers that we define “unproductive” may actually publish in journals not indexed by Web of 
Science or codify the new knowledge produced in different forms, such as books, patents, etc. 
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disciplinary areas, UDAs, 14 in all)3. In both the new and old system, competitions for 
recruitment and career advancement occur at SDS level. The 2008 competition 
procedures required appointment of committees to judge the curricula of the candidates. 
Each committee was to be composed of five full professors belonging to the SDS for 
which the position was open. One member, the president, was designated by the 
university holding the competition and the other four were drawn at random from a 
short list of other full professors in the SDS concerned. The short list was in turn 
established by national voting among all the full professors of the SDS. The candidate 
evaluations carried out by each committee were to be based on: 
• examination of the documented qualifications presented by each candidate; 
• results of an interview held to better understand the candidate’s career profile. 
The law required that the selection committees evaluate the candidates’ research 
activity on the basis of specific criteria, including: coherence of the candidate’s research 
history with the scientific field (SDS) for the competition, originality and 
methodological validity of the scientific production; scientific relevance of the journals 
or other media of publication and the diffusion of the resulting works within the 
scientific community; timeliness of the scientific production in relation to the evolution 
of knowledge in the SDS. The personal documentation to be evaluated was to concern: 
history of teaching activity; employment service in national and foreign universities and 
research institutes; organization, direction and coordination of research groups and/or 
initiatives in teaching and research. As a matter of fact, the discretionary powers of a 
committee are almost unlimited. 
After individual and joint judgments of all the candidates, the committee was 
required to vote as a whole for selection of two winning candidates4. At that point the 
university that held the competition was free to hire one of the two top finishers for the 
announced position while the other one remained eligible for hiring over the next five 
years without further competition, by any other university in the national system. 
In order to rationalize the process of the individual competitions over the entire 
system, the MIUR monitored and gathered the hiring proposals of the various 
universities and supported the evaluation procedures through information management 
systems aimed at better guaranteeing transparency. One of the ministry measures was to 
provide a Web portal5 with all the basic information on the competition procedures, 
posts available, number of candidates for each competition, the scheduling of the 
procedures and final results (winners list, etc.). 
The transparency provisions, nomination of a national committee of experts in the 
field, and the timely issue of regulations for the evaluation procedures were all intended 
to ensure efficiency in the selection process. In reality, the characteristics of Italian 
system – such as the generally strong inclination to favoritism, the structured absence of 
responsibility for poor performance by research units, and the lack of incentive schemes 
for merit – undermined the credibility of selection procedures for hiring and 
advancement of university personnel, just as happens for the Italian public 
3 The complete list is accessible on http://attiministeriali.miur.it/UserFiles/115.htm, last accessed on May 
26, 2014. 
4 The committees could also indicate a single winner or reject all the applicants, however such events 
occurred very rarely. 
5 Retrieved from: http://reclutamento.murst.it/, the open Web site managed by the MIUR, titled 
“Comparative evaluation in the recruitment of University Professors and Researchers (Law 3, 3 July 
1998, no. 210)”. 
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administration in general. This is demonstrated by the high and growing number of 
legal cases brought by losing candidates and by specific studies of systemic problems 
(Perotti, 2008; Zagaria, 2007), and not least by the unavoidable evidence of that 25% of 
current Italian faculty are scientifically unproductive. 
 
 
2.3 Dataset 
 
In 2008, 1,232 competitions for associate professor positions were announced by a 
total of 74 universities. The competitions concerned 299 SDSs. At the end of all the 
processes, which lasted an average of over two years6, the committees had named 2,339 
winners, out of a total of 16,500 candidates7. The ratio of number of winners of 
competitions to the size of the existing associate professor faculty averages as 12.8%, 
varying from a minimum of 8.7% in Earth sciences to a maximum of 21% in Law. In 
five UDAs the number of applications was higher than the current number of tenured 
associate professors. For Industrial and information engineering, compared to 1,493 
associate professors on faculty, there were 2,010 applications. The competitions 
generally announced two winners, with the exception of only 39 that announced one. Of 
the total 1,269 winners, 91.3% (1,159) were academics who were at the time already on 
staff as assistant professors. 
To ensure the representativity of publications as proxy of the research output for 
bibliometric assessment of research merit of candidates, our analysis focuses only on 
competitions in the hard sciences, and still more precisely on those SDSs where at least 
50% of professors produced at least one publication indexed in the WoS over the period 
2004-2008. For this period, there were 654 competitions that met such criteria, in a 
range of 193 SDSs. The only way to identify all the applicants in these 654 
competitions would be to read the minutes of each competition, as were generally 
published on-line by the individual universities. Given the prohibitive scope of such a 
task we selected a further subset of 287 competitions (44% of the total 654 in the hard 
sciences) launched by 12 institutions: the four universities with the highest numbers of 
competitions from each of the northern, central and southern national areas8. For this 
subset, the winners (550 in all) represent 22% of the total competition candidates 
(2,590); the rate of selection was more favorable for incumbent assistant professors 
(532/2,314=23%) than it was for other candidates (18/276=6.5%). Due to the 
difficulties of authorship disambiguation, our research method is only able to measure 
the productivity of applicants who are already university faculty members, thus our 
analysis of career advancement concentrates solely on such candidates. In addition, for 
the measure of research productivity to be robust, it must be calculated over a 
6 At the time of data elaboration, eleven competitions had not been completed.  
7 These figures relate to 1,221 competition procedures that were officially completed (out of 1,232 
launched) at the time of preparing the current research paper. 
8 At the time we initiated out study, the minutes of several competitions had been already withdrawn from 
the various university web sites, however the subset which we ultimately extracted provides a substantial 
dataset in terms of numerosity of observations and representativity in sectorial and geographic terms. 
Although the selection was not totally random, there do not appear to be evident problems in generalizing 
from the analytical results. In fact, given that the commission members are in all cases drawn at random 
from a national short list and their evaluation procedures are based on a nationally-enforced regulatory 
structure, it appears reasonable to assume that the phenomena investigated through the subset would be 
representative of the rest of the national competitions not included in the current observations. 
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sufficiently long period (Abramo et al., 2012b). Because of this, the analysis excludes 
assistant professors who entered faculty less than three years prior to the date of the 
competition. 
The dataset for the analysis is thus composed of 1,979 assistant professors, 473 of 
which were competition winners. Table 1 provides the characteristics of our dataset by 
UDA and its coverage with respect to overall competitions in the 193 SDSs of the hard 
sciences. 
On average there were nine participants per competition, of which eight were 
Italian-national academics. However the number of candidates shows significant 
variation (standard deviation 5.6), and 16 competitions involve 20 or more candidates. 
In the majority of competitions (263 out of 287) the committee designated two winners, 
with only 24 competitions resulting in a single winner. Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics concerning the candidates. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
3. The determinants 
 
In this section we present the methods for identifying and measuring the potential 
determinants of the competition results: scientific merit, nepotism and social proximity 
between candidates and selection-committee members. The objective is to determine if 
and to what extent the favoritism-related factors, rather than scientific merit, influence 
the results. 
 
 
3.1 Measuring scientific merit 
 
Research activity is a production process in which the inputs consist of human 
resources and other tangible (scientific instruments, materials, etc.) and intangible 
(accumulated knowledge, social networks, etc.) resources, and where outputs have a 
complex character of both tangible nature (publications, patents, conference 
presentations, databases, protocols, etc.) and intangible nature (tacit knowledge, 
consulting activity, etc.). The new-knowledge production function thus has a multi-
input and multi-output character. The principal efficiency indicator of any production 
system is labor productivity. 
The calculation of labor productivity requires a few simplifications and assumptions. 
It has been shown (Moed, 2005) that in the hard sciences, the prevalent form of 
codification of research output is publication in scientific journals. As a proxy of total 
output, in this work we consider only the specific publications (articles, article reviews, 
and proceeding papers) indexed in the Thomson Reuters WoS. 
When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production factors 
available to each scientist then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately relevant 
data are not available at the individual level in Italy. The first assumption then is that 
resources available to professors within the same field are the same. The second 
assumption is that the hours devoted to research are more or less the same for all 
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professors. Given the characteristics of the Italian academic system as depicted in 
section 2.1, the above assumptions appear acceptable. 
Because of the differences in the publication intensity across fields, a prerequisite of 
any distortion-free performance assessment is the classification of each researcher in 
one and only one field (Abramo et al., 2013b). 
Most bibliometricians define productivity as the number of publications in the 
period of observation. Because publications have different values (impact), we prefer to 
adopt a more meaningful definition of productivity, i.e. the value of output per unit 
value of labor, all other production factors being equal. The latter recognizes that the 
publications embedding new knowledge have different value or impact on scientific 
advancement, which bibliometricians approximate with citations or journal impact 
factors. Provided that there is an adequate citation window (at least two years) the use of 
citations is always preferable (Abramo et al., 2011). Because citation behavior varies by 
field, we standardize the citations for each publication with respect to the average of the 
distribution of citations for all the Italian cited publications of the same year and the 
same WoS subject category9. Furthermore, research projects frequently involve a team 
of professors, which is registered in the co-authorship of publications. In this case we 
account for the fractional contributions of scientists to outputs, which is at times further 
signaled by the position of the authors in the byline. 
At the individual level, professors of the same academic rank in this specific case, 
we can measure the average yearly productivity, named Fractional Scientific Strength 
(FSS), in the following way10: 
 
 [1] 
Where: 
t = number of years of work of the researcher in the period of observation; 
N = number of publications of the researcher in the period of observation; 
 = citations received by publication i; 
 = average of the distribution of citations received for all cited publications of the same 
year and subject category of publication i; 
 = fractional contribution of the researcher to publication i. 
Fractional contribution equals the inverse of the number of authors in those fields 
where the practice is to place the authors in simple alphabetical order but assumes 
different weights in other cases. For the life sciences, widespread practice in Italy is for 
the authors to indicate the various contributions to the published research by the order 
of the names in the byline. For the life science SDSs, we give different weights to each 
co-author according to their order in the byline and the character of the co-authorship 
(intra-mural or extra-mural) (see Abramo et al., 2013c). If first and last authors belong 
to the same university, 40% of citations are attributed to each of them; the remaining 
20% are divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors belong to 
different universities, 30% of citations are attributed to first and last authors; 15% of 
9 Abramo et al. (2012c) demonstrated that the average of the distribution of citations received for all cited 
publications of the same year and subject category is the best-performing scaling factor. 
10 A more extensive theoretical dissertation on how to operationalize the measurement of productivity can 
be found in Abramo and D’Angelo (2014a). 
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citations are attributed to second and last author but one; the remaining 10% are divided 
among all others11. 
Data on faculty of each university and their SDS classification are extracted from the 
database on Italian university personnel, maintained by the MIUR. The bibliometric 
dataset used to measure FSS is extracted from the Italian Observatory of Public 
Research (ORP), a database developed and maintained by the authors and derived under 
license from the Thomson Reuters WoS. Beginning from the raw data of the WoS, and 
applying a complex algorithm for reconciliation of the author’s affiliation and 
disambiguation of the true identity of the authors, each publication (article, article 
review and conference proceeding) is attributed to the university scientist or scientists 
that produced it (D’Angelo et al., 2011). Thanks to this algorithm we can produce 
rankings of research productivity at the individual level, on a national scale. Based on 
the value of FSS we obtain, for each SDS, a ranking list expressed on a percentile scale 
of 0-100 (worst to best) for comparison with the performance of all Italian colleagues of 
the same academic rank and SDS 
 
 
3.2. Nepotism 
 
Non-competitive higher education systems are exposed to greater risks of favoritism 
in recruitment and career advancement. In countries such as Italy, where political and 
economic favoritism are widespread, favoritism phenomena can be more accentuated 
(Zagaria, 2007; Perotti, 2009). The authors have previously explored the aspect of 
nepotism in the Italian university system (Abramo et. al., 2014a), as noted in the 
introduction. The previous research revealed that nepotism does take place, as seen in 
cases of children who advanced in their careers despite scientific performance in the 
bottom 20% of their SDSs. Such events were observed in 7.8% of the total of children 
who advanced in rank. 
In this work we will again identify the assistant professor candidates in our dataset 
who presumably have a parent full professor in the same university and in the same year 
as for their competition. 
The starting point for identifying family links within the same university is the 
identification of professors with the same last name (Allesina, 2011; Durante et al., 
2009; Angelucci et al. 2010; Güell et al., 2007). Pairs are then identified among the 
homonymous professors. For convenience we label the pairs as “parent-child”, even if 
they could be grandparent-grandchild, uncle/aunt-nephew/niece, brother-sister, cousins, 
or unrelated. This procedure inevitably excludes identification of most family relations 
headed by the “mother”. To make the identification of professors potentially subject to 
nepotism more reliable we impose the following conditions. The field of observation for 
“children” concerns assistant professors who participated in a competition announced in 
the year 2008; the “parents” are the full professors of the same university as the child, in 
role in the year 2008. Further, the family name must not be included on the list of the 
500 most common surnames in Italy12, nor among the 20 most common surnames in the 
11 The weighting values were assigned following advice from senior Italian professors in the life sciences. 
The values could be changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
12 Retrieved from the "International Laboratory of Onomastics". 
http://onomalab.uniroma2.it/contents/allegati/3000_cognomi_italia_2000.pdf. Last accessed on May 26, 
2014. 
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region where the university is based13. 
Beginning from the starting dataset of 1979 assistant professors, we identify 81 
children (4.1% of the total candidates), of which 24 were competition winners. The rate 
of selection was more favorable for children (24/81 = 29.6%) than it was for non-
children (449/1,898 = 23.7%). 
 
 
3.3 Social proximity 
 
The influence of applicant to evaluator social proximity on the outcome of 
competitions was previously examined by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012). Their research 
concentrated on the connections between candidates and examining-board evaluators 
for academic promotion in Spain. They consider various types of links, distinguishing 
strong ties (scientific collaboration, advisory roles, belonging to the same university) 
from weak ties and indirect ties,14 and show that the future performance of candidates 
who were promoted and had a weak connection with the evaluators was better than that 
of their “non-connected” colleagues. Conversely, successful candidates with a strong 
link to the evaluators register worse performance both before and after their promotion. 
In the current study we investigate the influence of social proximity on career 
advancement of Italian academics, distinguishing two types of candidate-evaluator 
links: 
• Workplace links: the candidate is from the same university as the committee 
president or as one of the other members. The intensity of the link is expressed by 
the number of the years that the applicant has spent in the same university and same 
SDS as the committee president or as the other evaluators, in the period 2001-2010; 
• Professional links: the candidate has co-authored publications with the committee 
president or members. For committee presidents, the link intensity is given by the 
percentage of the president’s publications coauthored with the candidate out of the 
total of the president’s publications in the period 2001-2010. For the committee, 
intensity is given by the number of committee members who co-authored 2001-2010 
publications with the candidate (value from 0 to 4). 
The applicant’s career history is a fundamental consideration because it reveals his 
or her experience and qualifications. It is also important because career events include 
development of a network of contacts and colleagues that permit future benefits of 
various kinds, from professional development opportunities to favoritism in access to 
resources and career progression. We thus examine the careers of both the applicants 
and evaluators to determine the number of years that each applicant spent in the same 
university and SDS as his or her evaluators over the period 2001-2010. We include the 
“post-competition” years 2009-2010 because the completion of the announced 
competitions in almost all cases extended through these additional two years. We also 
distinguish the career years shared with the committee president from those shared with 
13 Retrieved from www.cognomix.it. Last accessed on May 26, 2014. 
14 According to Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012), a weak ties exists when at least one of the following 
conditions occurs: the evaluator was a member of the candidate's thesis committee; the evaluator has 
invited the candidate to sit on the thesis committee of one of his or her students (or vice versa); the 
evaluator and the candidate sat on the same thesis committee. An indirect tie exists when at least one of 
the following conditions occurs: the evaluator and the candidate have either a common advisor or a 
common thesis committee member or a common co-author. 
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the other evaluators, based on the hypothesis that the president, chosen by the university 
that called for the competition, will have greater weight in the final committee decision 
than the other evaluators. Instances of shared professional work can be objectively 
measured by the proxy of publications in co-authorship. Cooperation in common 
projects, where scientists have common research objectives and interests, can in fact 
lead to very strong social ties characterized by reciprocal opinions of respect and trust. 
To analyze the influence of such candidate-evaluator research collaborations on 
competition outcomes we selected the publications for the 2001-2010 period. Although 
the competitions were announced in 2008, we again included publications from 2009-
2010, in this case because substantial time can elapse before a publication actually 
arrives in print. An article published as late as 2010 is very likely the result of shared 
work in previous years, including 2008 and prior. This measure also again takes account 
of the fact that the first steps in the candidate evaluations were carried out a year after 
the competition announcement, and thus could be influenced by post-2008 
collaborations. 
 
 
4. Statistical Analysis 
 
For the current study we formulated a statistical model that links the competition 
outcome to the determinants described in Section 3. 
The dependent variable, the competition outcome, is a Boolean type variable with 
value of 1 in the case that the applicant wins, or 0 otherwise. The six independent 
variables are: the parental link between applicant and full professors in the same 
university; the career years that an applicant has spent in the same university and same 
SDS as the committee president; the career years that an applicant has spent in the same 
university and the same SDS as other committee members; the percentage of the 
president’s publications coauthored with the candidate; the number of other committee 
members with which the applicant has co-authored publications; and, as proxy of 
scientific merit, the applicant’s scientific productivity FSS for the five years 2004-2008 
(with citations observed on 31/12/2011). 
As the basis of the statistical model we choose the logistic regression function 
(rendered linear through the logit function), which is particularly suited for modeling 
dichotomous dependent variables. A strictly linear model would not be sufficiently 
representative of the distribution of values. 
Formally, the statistical model is described: 
 
 
 [2] 
Where: 
 =  
E = competition outcome, with a value of 1 if the applicant wins the competition, 
otherwise 0; 
p(E) = probability of event E; 
β = generic regression coefficient; 
= applicant’s research productivity over the period 2004-2008, expressed on a 0-
100 percentile scale; 
12 
 
 = value of 1 if the applicant and a full professor in the same university have the 
same family name, as of 31/12/2008; otherwise 0; 
= applicant’s career years in the same university and same SDS as the committee 
president over the period 2001-2010; 
= applicant’s career years in the same university and the same SDS as the other 
evaluation committee members over the period 2001-2010. 
= percentage of committee president’s publications in co-authorship with the 
candidate over the period 2001-2010. 
= number of other committee members with which the applicant has co-authored 
publications over the period 2001-2010. 
 
Prior to applying the statistical model we present the descriptive statistics for the 
variables in Table 3. For each variable we show the average, standard deviation (SD) 
and the maximum value occurring for the competition winners, non-winners and total 
applicants in the dataset. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
As would be expected, the winners’ scientific performance is on average higher than 
that of non-winners (68.29 for winners versus 61.73 for non-winners). However the 
statistics also permit several other interesting observations. For all applicants, the 
average number of years in the same university as the committee president is 2.11; for 
winners this figure rises to 4.27 and for non-winners it drops to 1.43. For the set of all 
applicants, the average number of years spent in the same university as the other 
evaluators is 1.27, compared to 1.23 for the winners and 1.28 for non-winners. 
Concerning publications, on average the full set of participants contribute to 2.37% of 
the president’s scientific production; winners contribute to 7.01% and non-winners to 
0.91%. Among winners, 5% have the same family name of a full professor in the same 
university; among non-winners, 4%. 
 
4.1 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the test for links between the regressors. In this 
case, the Pearson correlation analysis indicates the absence of correlation between the 
independent variables figuring in the model. The highest correlation is between PP and 
CP, at 0.365. This is line with what we expect, since scientists in the same university 
and SDS would tend to cooperate in shared research work. 
Thus from the Pearson correlation analysis it emerges that the hypothesis of 
independence between the variables can be considered valid. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
4.2 The Logistic Regression Model 
 
Table 5 presents the logistic regression results predicting the competition outcomes. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The odds ratio for the competition outcomes (i.e. probability of winning the 
competition relative to the probability of not winning) is formalized: 
 
 
 [3] 
The value eb, calculated for each potential explanatory variable, represent OR in 
Table 1. Where OR equals 1 the associated explanatory variable would have no effect 
on the dependent variable of “competition outcome”. 
The average value of VIF (Variance inflation factor), calculated at 1.11, confirms 
the absence of multicollinearity in the model. 
The values calculated for standardized b (last column, Table 5) permit comparison 
of the effects of the variables measured in different metrics. The data indicate that the 
factor having the greatest influence on the competition outcomes (bStdCP=0.655) seems 
to be the number of the applicant’s years in the same university and same SDS as the 
committee president. In particular, every unit increase in the number of career years 
shared with the president increases the odds of success by a factor of 1.195. Co-
authorship of publications with the committee president (PP) also has remarkable 
bearing on the competition results (bStdPP=0.313), with every percent increase in PP 
increasing the odds of success by a factor of 1.030. As well, the applicant’s scientific 
productivity (FSS) has notable weight (bStdFSS = 0.332), with every unit increase in the 
FSS increasing the odds of success by a factor of 1.013. Shared research work with 
other committee members has a lesser bearing (bStdMP = 0.192) on competition 
outcome, however still to a significant level. Similarly, the applicant’s career years with 
the other evaluators (bStdCM = 0.121) also has lesser bearing, and to a lower significant 
level. Concerning the parental link between applicant and full professors in the same 
university (NE), the small number of “children” makes this finding non-significant. 
Returning to the formula model, we can now calculate p, the probability of 
succeeding in career progression competitions based on the specific observed values of 
the independent variables: 
 
 
 [4] 
Table 6 provides the results from simulations in which we estimate the probability 
of a candidate’s success based on different values of FSS and CP, assuming mean 
values for all other variables. From the model we see that a candidate with the 
maximum possible FSS (percentile 100) but without any shared history in the 
committee president’s university would have a 0.231 probability of success. However a 
candidate with a value of FSS equal to 50 but with five years in the same university and 
SDS as the president would have better chances of succeeding (equal to 0.276). 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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5. Impact of evaluators’ scientific productivity, the geographic area of competition, 
and international reputation in the discipline 
 
In this section we examine the impact on competition outcomes of: i) the committee 
members’ scientific quality; ii) the geographic area of the selection competitions; and 
iii) the international reputation of Italy in the discipline. 
 
 
5.1 Impact of the evaluators’ scientific productivity on competition outcomes 
 
In analyzing the impact of the evaluators’ scientific productivity, we consider the 
competition outcome: as expected, if the winners’ FSS over the period 2004-2008 
results as not less than the median of FSS distributions for both the competition 
applicants and for all assistant professors in the same SDS; otherwise not as expected. 
The committees are considered: adequate, if at least three members out of five show a 
2004-2008 FSS not less than the median of the distribution of all full professors in the 
SDS: otherwise inadequate. 
To ensure a robust measure of the candidates’ research productivity the analysis 
excludes those competitions that fail to show a winner or any non-winning participant 
with at least three years on staff in the 2004-2008 period (46 out of 287). Similarly, 
regarding the productivity of the evaluators, we exclude the competitions where one or 
more committee members had held their faculty role for less than three years over the 
2004-2008 period (2 out of 287) (see Abramo et al., 2012b). Given the exclusions, we 
reduce the number of competitions observed to 239. Of these there are 106 competitions 
where the outcomes are as expected, of which 74 had adequate committees, and 133 
with non-expected outcomes, of which 77 had adequate committees (Table 7). The test 
for association shows a Pearson chi-square result of 3.60, with a non-significant p-value 
of 0.058, and a likelihood-ratio chi-square of 3.63, with non-significant p-value of 
0.057. The odds ratio (OR) results as 1.68, demonstrating a modest positive association 
between competition’s with expected outcomes and adequacy of the scientific 
committee. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
5.2 Influence of the geographic area 
 
A frequently encountered opinion is that favoritism in academic institutions is more 
concentrated in southern than northern Italy (Allesina, 2011; Durante et al., 2011). We 
thus localize the universities (north, central, south) that announced the competitions and 
conduct an analysis to detect the potential influence of geographic area on their 
outcome. 
The north-south comparison shows that there are 84 competitions with expected 
outcomes (applying the same criteria for winners’ scientific productivity as in the 
preceding section), of which 58 were held in the north, and 104 competitions with non-
expected outcomes of which 68 were held in the north (Table 8). The Pearson chi-
square results as 0.28, with a non-significant p-value at 0.595, and the likelihood-ratio 
chi-square is 0.28 with a non-significant p-value at 0.595. The odds ratio (OR) 
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calculated for the association is 1.18, indicating a weakly positive association between 
the outcome of an “expected” competition result and the fact that the competition is held 
in northern rather than southern university. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
We also conduct the same analysis for the north-central and central-south 
combinations of competition location. For the north to center comparison, the Pearson 
chi-square result is 0.429, with a non-significant p-value of 0.513. The likelihood-ratio 
chi-square result is 0.430 with a non-significant p-value of 0.512. The odds ratio (OR) 
results as 1.24, indicating a weak positive association between the outcome of an 
“expected” competition result and the fact that the competition is held in a northern 
rather than central-Italian university. In the case of the central to south comparison, both 
the Pearson chi-square and likelihood-ratio chi-squared give results of 0.017, with non-
significant p-value at 0.896. The odds ratio is 0.95, showing a very weak association 
between competition outcomes “as expected” and the fact that the competition is held 
by a central-Italian rather than southern university. 
 
 
5.3 Impact of the international reputation of Italy in the discipline 
 
One would expect that committees in disciplines where Italy has an international 
long-standing reputation would be more reluctant than others to sacrifice research 
excellence to other dimensions of quality in the selection criteria. We tested this 
hypothesis, starting from the results of a recent investigation by Abramo and D’Angelo 
(2014b), which showed that Italy’s relative scientific strength is high in physics, 
chemistry, and medicine, and low in economics and statistics, civil engineering, and 
mathematics. We then analyzed the distributions of competition outcomes by UDA 
(Table 9). 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The analysis shows that mathematics and earth sciences are the only UDAs where 
the majority of outcomes are as expected. We conducted association tests between the 
competition outcomes in the UDA of mathematics and, respectively, physics, chemistry 
and medicine. Between mathematics and physics, the test for association shows Pearson 
chi-square = 4.29 with a p-value = 0.037, likelihood-ratio chi-square = 4.33 with a p-
value = 0.038. The odds ratio (OR) = 3.82, demonstrates a more than moderate positive 
association between competitions with expected outcomes and the fact that the 
competitions occurred in mathematics rather than in physics. The same holds true for 
the association tests between mathematics and chemistry (Pearson chi-square = 5.50 
with a p-value = 0.019, likelihood-ratio chi-square = 5.61 with a p-value = 0.018, OR = 
4.25); and between mathematics and medicine (Pearson chi-square = 6.17, with p-value 
= 0.013, and a likelihood-ratio chi-square = 6.31, with p-value = 0.012, OR = 3.64. A 
relationship between international scientific strength in a discipline and attention to the 
scientific merit of candidates can then be excluded. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The presence of competition is known to serve as a major stimulus for continuous 
improvement and the pursuit of excellence. Lacking such stimuli, non-competitive 
education systems appear more at risk of non-efficient recruitment and career 
advancement processes, with negative outcomes for quality of education and research. 
Such phenomena appear even more probable in countries with a general environment 
characterized by favoritism. 
In a preceding work (Abramo et al., 2014b), we evaluated the efficiency of the 
selection process for career advancement of university professors, referring to the case 
of competitions for associate professor announced in the Italian academic system for the 
year 2008. The analyses showed that in the three years following the competitions, the 
new associate professors were on average more productive than their incumbent 
colleagues. However several critical issues appeared, particularly concerning 
unsuccessful candidates who outperformed the competition winners in terms of 
productivity over the subsequent triennium, as well as a number of competition winners 
who resulted as totally unproductive. An analysis of the individual competitions showed 
that almost half of the selected candidates would go on to achieve below-median 
productivity in their field of reference over the subsequent period. 
In the present study, we have investigated the determinants of the results emerging 
from the previous study. Our intention was to provide an interpretation of the potential 
factors that could have contributed to the outcomes of the 2008 round of competitions. 
In particular, we investigated the extent to which: i) favoritism and nepotism could have 
conditioned the competition outcomes; ii) if the scientific quality of the selection 
committee members could have influenced outcomes; iii) if there are significant 
differences in outcomes between broad geographic areas. 
From the analyses, it emerges that the fundamental determinant of a candidate’s 
success is not his or her scientific merit, but rather the number of their years of service 
in the same university as the committee president. Where the candidate has cooperated 
in joint research work with the president the probability of success also increases 
significantly. The factors of the years of service and occurrence of joint research with 
the other committee members have lesser weight. The phenomenon of potential 
nepotism, although it occurs, seems to have a lower impact. These outcomes explain 
also why universities are closed shops; the concentration index of incumbent assistant 
professors who win the competitions is 1.1 against 0.3 of outside candidates.  
The results of our regression model confirm what Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012) 
have demonstrated for the Spanish case, showing once again that links between 
colleagues have a strong weight in the final judgment of the selection committees. In 
fact we observe that when the candidate has such links with the committee president the 
influence on the competition outcome seems even greater than the weight of the 
applicant’s scientific productivity. 
A further step in the analysis detected that there is a modest positive association 
between an “expected” outcome to the competition, where the winner truly has 
scientific merit, and the scientific value of the committee members. A final test for 
concentration of potential favoritism in particular national areas showed that there is a 
weak positive association between “expected” outcomes to competitions and the fact 
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that these are held in northern universities rather than southern or central-Italian 
universities. 
A scientific standpoint cannot do without warning the decision maker about the 
limits of the analysis and suggesting the usual caution in the interpretation of results. 
First of all, all limits of inferential analysis apply here: our results are based on a subset 
of 243 observations out of a population of 654 competitions in the hard sciences. To 
establish the research strength of candidates we have measured their productivity in the 
period 2004-2008. Research performance before 2004 may well have been taken into 
account by the selection committees. Furthermore, it should be recognized that 
scientific merit is not the only dimension of the quality of a candidate. Other dimensions 
may also have been considered by the selection committees, such as teaching skills, 
technology transfer achievements, demonstrated abilities to attract funds, coordinate 
research teams or carry out editorial activities. Evaluators might in principle be more 
informed about the true quality of connected candidates, and they might efficiently use 
their private information in their evaluations. There is some likelihood that the 
candidate with the best fit to a given department, is already employed by it. 
The results of our analysis may be open then to a twofold interpretation: favoritism 
or “smart” recruitment. While on the one side findings on the future productivity of 
candidates (Abramo et al., 2014b) seem to exclude efficiency in the use of inside 
information by the committee members, on the other side the fact that in disciplines 
with strong scientific performance competitions outcomes as expected are fewer than in 
weak disciplines seems to suggest smart recruitment. Further research is needed to find 
out which is the correct interpretation of our findings, which may also subtend both 
favoritism in some competitions and smart hiring in others,   
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 Table 1: Population subset selected for analysis (in parentheses the percentage with respect to the 
overall reference population) 
 
UDA Competitions SDSs concerned 
Universities 
launching 
competitions 
Winners 
Academic 
winners with 
seniority ≥ 3 years 
Mathematics and computer science 26 (46%) 7 (78%) 10 (40%) 50 (46%) 45 (47%) 
Physics 19 (42%) 5 (63%) 8 (33%) 37 (43%) 30 (41%) 
Chemistry 25 (46%) 8 (67%) 9 (38%) 47 (46%) 44 (48%) 
Earth sciences 6 (30%) 4 (33%) 4 (33%) 10 (27%) 5 (17%) 
Biology 25 (34%) 14 (74%) 10 (30%) 49 (34%) 39 (31%) 
Medicine 62 (41%) 32 (68%) 9 (27%) 116 (40%) 87 (40%) 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 15 (31%) 11 (39%) 5 (26%) 27 (29%) 26 (30%) 
Civil engineering and architecture 11 (42%) 6 (86%) 8 (38%) 22 (43%) 22 (46%) 
Industrial and information engineering 86 (60%) 31 (74%) 12 (39%) 170 (62%) 155 (62%) 
Pedagogy and psychology 5 (24%) 3 (60%) 3 (23%) 8 (20%) 7 (21%) 
Economics and statistics 7 (39%) 3 (75%) 4 (36%) 14 (39%) 13 (41%) 
Total 287 (44%) 124 (64%) 12 (21%) 550 (43%) 473 (44%) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the candidates involved in the dataset of competitions 
 
    Candidates per competition 
 Winners Non winners Total  Average Median Std Dev Max Total candidates 550 2,040 2,590 9 8 5.6 29 
Academics 532 1,782 2,314 8 7 5.4 28 
Others 18 258 276 1 1 1.2 6 
Academics with seniority ≥ 3 years 473 1,506 1,979 7 6 4.6 26 
Academics with seniority < 3 years 59 276 335 1 1 1.3 6 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for logistic regression variables 
 
Var. Winners Non winners Total Avg SD Max Avg SD Max Avg SD Max 
FSS 68.29 23.37 100 61.73 25.02 100 63.30 24.79 100 
NE 0.05 0.22 1 0.04 0.19 1 0.04 0.20 1 
CP 4.27 4.37 10 1.43 3.15 10 2.11 3.68 10 
CE 1.23 3.48 20 1.28 3.37 21 1.27 3.39 21 
PP 7.01 17.01 91.18 0.91 6.23 97.36 2.37 10.26 97.36 
MP 0.12 0.37 3 0.08 0.29 2 0.09 0.31 3 
Number of observations = 1,979 
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Table 4: Correlation among variables 
 
 E FSS NE CP CE PP MP 
E 1       
FSS 0.113*** 1      
NE 0.028 -0.014 1     
CP 0.329*** -0.003 -0.013 1    
CE -0.007 -0.052** -0.007 -0.202*** 1   
PP 0.254*** 0.043* 0.005 0.365*** -0.078*** 1  
MP 0.063*** 0.012 -0.035 -0.092*** 0.345*** -0.036 1 
Statistical significance: * p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
Number of observations = 1,979 
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Table 5: Logistic regression results predicting competition outcomes 
 
 
 OR Std Err Z p>|z| StdX 
FSS 0.013*** 1.013 0.002 5.218 0.000 0.322 
NE 0.468* 1.597 0.272 1.716 0.086 0.093† 
CP 0.178*** 1.195 0.015 11.648 0.000 0.655 
CE 0.036** 1.037 0.018 1.998 0.046 0.121 
PP 0.030*** 1.030 0.006 4.880 0.000 0.313 
MP 0.618*** 1.855 0.177 3.486 0.000 0.192 
Constant -2.696*** - 0.192 -14.060 0.000  
Dependent variable: competition outcome; method of estimation: logistic regression; b = raw coefficient; 
OR= Odds Ratio (exp b); z = z-score for test of b=0; p>|z| = p-value for z-test; bStdX= X 
standardized coefficient. 
Statistical significance: * p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01. 
Number of observations = 1,979; LR chi2(6) = 279.40; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -948.6203; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1284; mean VIF=1.11 
† In this case the standardized coefficient is not considered because the explanatory variable is binary. 
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Table 6: Estimated probabilities of success in competitions on the basis of applicant’s FSS and career 
experience in the same university as the committee president, assuming mean values for other 
variables 
 
  
Years career with president 
  
0 1 2 5 10 
FS
S 
100 0.231 0.264 0.300 0.422 0.640 
50 0.135 0.158 0.183 0.276 0.481 
10 0.085 0.100 0.117 0.185 0.356 
Number of observations = 1,979 
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Table 7: Classification of competitions in function of outcome and adequacy of the selection committee 
 
Committee/Outcome As expected Not expected 
Adequate 
Frequency 74 77 
Expected frequency 67 84 
Chi2 contribution 0.7 0.6 
Not adequate 
Frequency 32 56 
Expected frequency 39 49 
Chi2 contribution 1.3 1.0 
Number of observations = 239 
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Table 8: Classification of competitions on the basis of outcome and north-south geographic area 
 
Geographic area/Outcome As expected Not expected 
North 
Frequency 58 68 
Expected frequency 56.3 69.7 
Chi2 contribution 0.1 0.0 
South 
Frequency 26 36 
Expected frequency 27.7 34.3 
Chi2 contribution 0.1 0.1 
Number of observations = 188 
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Table 9: Competition outcomes by UDA. 
 
UDA 
Competition outcome Total 
competitio
ns 
As 
expected 
Not 
expected 
Mathematics and computer science 17 (70.8) 7 (29.2) 24 
Physics 7 (38.9) 11 (61.1) 18 
Chemistry 8 (36.4) 14 (63.6) 22 
Earth sciences 4 (100.0)  - 4 
Biology 9 (45.0) 11 (55.0) 20 
Medicine 20 (40.0) 30 (60.0) 50 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 4 (40.0) 6 (60.0) 10 
Civil engineering and architecture 5 (45.5) 6 (54.5) 11 
Industrial and information engineering 28 (38.4) 45 (61.6) 73 
Pedagogy and psychology 1 (25.0) 3 (75.0) 4 
Economics and statistics 3 (42.9) 4 (57.1) 7 
Total 106 (43.6) 137 (56.4) 243 
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